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Introduction 
The polarization phenomenon is directly linked to the sources of social 
tension. The notion has its roots in sociology and political science, with Karl 
Marx arguably being the first social scientist to study it. In economics, its 
formal analysis has its origins in the nineties, in the work of Esteban and Ray 
(1991,1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994). It was 
subsequently extended, with the ultimate goal of developing not just an index 
that measured polarization, but also achieving an understanding of the possible 
causes which may affect it5. 
Polarization is a concept that is distinct from inequality, and can be traced 
to social, economic, and political factors. The motivation for this paper is to 
analyze the evolution of polarization in Argentina during the unstable period 
1998-2002, with the aim of furthering our understanding of the nature of 
distributive changes.  
This work is divided into two main sections: theoretical and empirical. 
The first has as goal to provide a brief survey of the evolution of the concept 
of polarization, beginning with an explanation for the simpler case of discrete 
variables. We subsequently discuss the latest developments in the 
measurement for the case of continuous variables. We wish to underscore the 
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fact that we follow the approach of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004) for discrete and continuous variables respectively6. 
The empirical section includes the results for Argentina and their analysis. 
It starts by tracing the evolution of polarization and comparing it with that of 
inequality, followed by a look at the robustness of our results and a study of 
the causes of the change over time – both by considering how the 
identification effect and the alienation effect affect the index, and by using a 
micro-simulation technique. It ends with a regional analysis.  
I. Polarization: definition and measurement7
A population can be seen as a set of distinct groups that differ in the 
characteristics of their members. Thus, a group is “similar” to another one 
when their component members have similar features and “different” when 
their members have dissimilar characteristics8. A society will be deemed to be 
polarized when for a given joint distribution of characteristics, the population 
is clustered around a small number of distant points9. As a society becomes 
more polarized, conflict will be more likely.  
The degree of clustering is important for a large number of social and 
economic variables. Among the former we find the issues of social class, race, 
religion, nationality, political parties, etc. In the economic case we find, among 
others, labor market segmentation and the distribution of firm size within an 
industry. This notion is also relevant when the defining characteristic of each 
group is their income.  
We would like to emphasize that these first sections are based on the 
discussion by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004), 
which should be consulted by the interested reader.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004). 
7 The reader who is familiar with the concepts developed in the work of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004) may skip to the empirical section. 
8 Esteban and Ray (1994) 
9 Esteban (2002) 
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I.1 Polarization and inequality  
For a distribution of individual characteristics to be considered polarized, 
it must display the following characteristics:  
1. High level of homogeneity within each group  
2. High level of heterogeneity between groups  
3. Small number of big groups. In particular, groups of negligible size, 
such as one individual, should have a small influence on the whole.  
Each of the previous conditions is linked to the emergence of social 
tension. In the case of one single person with very different characteristics 
from the rest, she would not have a significant role in the development of 
conflict. Thus, if a group consists of individuals who are “similar” among 
them, we would expect their goals to be the same, or at least similar enough 
that they feel a strong sense of unity given by their sense of “identification”. In 
much the same way, the existence of a clear-cut difference between two 
groups, “alienation” would, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in social 
tension. In other words, the goals of each group may conflict.  
Esteban and Ray thus define a framework within which polarization may 
be summarized as the interaction between the identification and alienation that 
each individual feels with respect to the rest (IA).   
The three postulates that were mentioned above allow us to clarify the 
difference between this concept and inequality. In order to capture the first 
feature, assume the existence of two distributions of income across a 
population, in two moments of time. In the first moment, population is evenly 
spread among 10 income values separated by a gap of one unit each. At time 2 
the population is uniformly distributed between two income groups, clustered 
around points three and eight.  
In the following figures we can observe that the second distribution is 
more polarized than the first. There exist two perfectly defined groups, which 
generate a high degree of identification when compared to the first, where the 
sense of group is vague. In the second distribution people are either “rich” or 
“poor”, without the presence of a “middle class” to bridge the gap. This can be 
regarded as a situation with higher tension than that in the initial period.  
At the same time, it is important to note that while polarization increased 
in this case, there was a decrease in inequality as measured by any index 
consistent with Dalton’s transfers principle. 
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Figure 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
It could further happen that income is concentrated in two peaks, but 
instead of 3 and 8 they are 1 and 10. Going to this case from the first 
distribution leads to higher heterogeneity between groups, or “alienation”, as 
well as resulting in increased homogeneity within each group. In contrast to 
our previous argument, it is not just polarization that would grow, but 
inequality as well. Thus, we cannot assert that polarization and inequality are 
always at odds with each other.  
Figure 2 
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In order to interpret the third characteristic, we will consider a population 
that is distributed across three equally spaced points. Initially, the mass in the 
center and right are approximately the same. At a second stage, there is a small 
shift from the left end to the right. The problem is now more complex than in 
the first two cases. Despite the fact that such a move would tend to create two 
distinctly defined groups, the mass in the left could have originally been an 
instrument to introduce social tension, and the net effect is therefore not 
clearly defined.  
If the group on the left were instead small compared with the other two, 
its initial influence on conflict would have been small, and it could be argued 
that a similar change would unambiguously increase polarization.  
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Figure 3 
 
 
Two examples of polarization measures for discrete variables are the Wolfson 
and the Esteban, Gardin and Ray (1999) indices: 
 
Wolfson: 
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where µ = mean, m= median, L(0.5) = value of the Lorenz curve at the median 
income and G = Gini coefficient. 
 
Esteban, Gardin and Ray (1999): 
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ER *),(P µµππρα α1 , =α identification factor,  vector 
of values that include bounds, quantity of individuals, and the mean income 
for each group that minimizes inequality within each of the n groups.  
=*ρ
G(f) = Gini coefficient for the whole population 
G( )= Gini coefficient for the population defined by  *ρ *ρ
The Wolfson index measures a notion of distance from bipolarization 
with symmetric groups. The EGR index, on the other hand, captures the 
antagonism that results from the interplay of identification and alienation, 
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assuming that individuals are pre-assigned to n groups, and proposes a 
methodology to define the location of each group10. 
 
I. 2 The income polarization index  
 
In the previous subsection we identified two forces that affect each 
individual: identification and alienation. Given that polarization is related to 
social tension, the measure that summarizes it must take into account both 
factors. Should any of those be absent, any antagonism would be eliminated.  
Two problems arise when applying polarization indexes defined in terms 
of discrete variables to continuous variables, such as income, consumption, 
and the like. On the one hand, continuous changes in polarization are not 
captured in some cases, given that the population is divided into a finite 
number of groups. The ER (1994)11 indexes have this problem. 
On the other hand, these indices assume that the population is already 
divided into a small number of relevant groups12. In other words, there is a 
certain degree of arbitrariness in the choice of number of groups. For instance, 
the Wolfson index implicitly assumes the population is divided into two 
groups of similar size, and this precludes the accurate detection of changes in 
polarization when there exist more than two mass points. Another instance is 
provided by EGR (1999), who leave the definition of the number of groups or 
poles into which to divide the population to the researcher’s discretion.  
The Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER)13, sets out to solve these problems. 
In order to do so, they redefine the axioms that must be satisfied by a 
polarization index for continuous variables and present a measure of “pure 
income polarization”. This new index allows for individuals not to be clustered 
around discrete income intervals, and lets the size of each group be determined 
by nonparametric kernel techniques, avoiding arbitrary choices.  
The following axioms that are satisfied by the DER index are based on a 
density with finite support (kernel), and symmetric reductions in dispersion 
that concentrate the density around its mean (squeezes). 
 
                                                 
10 For a more thorough analysis of each of the measures we refer the reader to: Wolfson (1994), Esteban, 
Gardin and Ray (1999) 
11 Esteban and Ray (1994) pp 845-847 
12 Esteban and Ray (1994) 
13 Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) 
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Axiom 1: if a distribution is made up of a basic density, then a squeeze cannot 
increase polarization.  
 
 
In
 
Axiom 2: if a symmetric distribution is composed by three basic densities then 
a squeeze in the outer densities should not reduce polarization. 
 
 
 
Axiom 3: if we consider a symmetric distribution made up of four basic 
densities with disjoint supports, then a move of the center distributions 
towards their outer neighbors, while keeping the disjoint supports, should 
increase polarization.  
 
 
 
come 
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Income 
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Axiom 4: Given two distributions F and G, if P(F) ≥ P(G), being P(F) and 
P(G) the respective polarization indexes, it must be that P(α F) ≥ P(α G), 
where α F and α G represent a rescaled version of F and G. 
 
In this manner, the authors establish that a general polarization measure that 
respects the previous axioms must be proportional to: 
 
∫∫ −≡ + dydxxy)y(f)x(f)f(P αα 1  
 
Remark that in order to respect the axioms the α  parameter must lie within 
the interval [0.25, 1]14. The formula can be rewritten as: 
 
∫= )y(dF)y(g)y(f)F(P αα  
 
Where g(y) captures the “alienation” effect, and f(y)α  the 
“identification”. It is interesting to note that with α =0, the polarization index 
coincides with the Gini coefficient15. 
If we have a sample of incomes with independent and identically 
distributed observations ranked from smallest to highest, the indicator’s 
operational formula is: 
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Where yi is the ith individual income, µˆ is the sample mean, wi is the weight 
of individual i, and ∑
=
=
n
j
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1
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14 The infimum and supremum of the interval follow from axioms 2 and 1 respectively.  
15 For a more detailed analysis of how the parameter affects the indicator, read Duclos, Esteban and Ray 
(2004) pp 1746-1747. 
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The function  is a nonparametric kernel estimate of the income density, 
using a bandwidth that minimizes the mean square error of the estimator h
)y(fˆ i
*, 
given by: 
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Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) provide other formulas that are easier to 
compute. The first can be used with normal distributions and will not exceed 
the h* that minimizes the means square error by more than 5%.  
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The second is for distributions with skewness greater than 6:  
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where IQ is the interquantile range, and inσ  is the variance of log-income.  
 
II. Application 
 
In this section we present the results of the estimation of the pure income 
polarization index for Argentina, following the methodology explained in 
DER (2004). We also draw a comparison with an inequality index and with the 
previous polarization indexes of EGR (1999) and Wolfson (1994). We 
subsequently perform a microdecomposition with the goal of exploring the 
possible factors that might explain the evolution of the indicator. Lastly, we 
calculate the index by region and draw a comparison with regional inequality 
indicators. 
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II.1 Methodological aspects  
 
The polarization indices are computed using the October wave of the 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (Permanent Household Survey – EPH) for 
the years 1998 to 2002. These include 28 urban conglomerates that allow the 
country to be divided into six regions: Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), Región 
Pampeana, Cuyo, Noroeste (NOA), Noreste (NEA) and Patagonia16.  
The variable we study is the mean normalized income per equivalent 
adult using the official equivalent adult scale of the Instituto de Estadísticas 
and Censos (INDEC). The observations with negative income and those that 
were more than 20 times the median were eliminated, as were those that the 
Institute discards17.  
 
 
II.2 Results 
 
II. 2.1 Evolution and Causes 
 
Evolution 
 
The following table presents the evolution of the income polarization 
index in Argentina during the period 1998 to 200218, evaluated at different 
weights for the identification factor.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 GBA: City of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires; PAMPEANA: La Plata, Bahía Blanca, Rosario, 
Santa Fe, Paraná, Córdoba, Concordia, Santa Rosa, Mar del Plata and Río Cuarto; CUYO: Mendoza, San 
Juan and San Luis; NOA: Catamarca, Salta, La Rioja, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero and Jujuy; NEA: 
Corrientes, Formosa, Resistencia and Posadas; and PATAGONIA: Comodoro, Rivadavia, Neuquén, Río 
Gallegos, Tierra del Fuego and Alto Valle del Río Negro. 
17 Zero income observations are eliminated because we observe substantial variation in the proportion of 
individuals with zero income in different years. These changes presumably come from better recording of 
low income individuals.  
18 We used the bandwidth formula for normal distributions, following the recommendations of Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004), because the skewness of the income distribution in each year is close to 3.5. 
However, the conclusions are not sensitive to a more robust choice of bandwidth.  
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Table 1: Polarization and Inequality – Countrywide 
Polarization
OBS 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
 
We observe that the index increased throughout the period, regardless of 
the choice of alpha. Furthermore, the evolution was similar to that of the 
inequality index – recall that if α =0 the polarization index equals the Gini 
coefficient.  
The validity of the increase in polarization can be tested by using 
bootstrapping or resampling methods. This technique allows us to build 95% 
confidence intervals, thereby enabling us to test for the existence of a 
significant change. We find there is a significant change whenever these 
intervals do not overlap.  
We performed the analysis on the polarization indexes with parameters 
0.5 and 0.75, given that values nearby 0.25 and 1 may conflict with some of 
the axioms19. 
Table 2: Confidence intervals for polarization indexes 
(100 bootstrap samples) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
                                                 
19 Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) pp. 1744 and 1758. 
0 0.25 0.5
α 
0.75 1
1998 0.  4851 92754 0.347 7 0.279 2 0 .2395 0 .2135      
1999 0.  4817 85343 0.345 0 0.276 7 0 .2368 0 .2104      
2000 0.  4940 77343 0.353 2 0.282 6 0 .2414 0 .2144      
2001 0.  5139 76945 0.365 0 0.291 7 0 .2495 0 .2220      
2002 0.  5181 77001 0.370 1 0.297 8 0 .2572 0 .2315      
Observed Lowest Highest Observed Lowest Highest 
1998 0.2792     0.2773 0.2803 0.2395  0.2367 0.2410 
1999 0.2767     0.2743 0.2776 0.2368  0.2341 0.2385 
2000 0.2826     0.2806 0.2843 0.2414  0.2384 0.2434 
2001 0.2917     0.2900 0.2933 0.2495  0.2471 0.2520 
2002 0.2978     0.2947 0.2999 0.2572  0.2540 0.2607 
α = 0.5 α = 0.75
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From table 2 we can tell that for α = 0.5 the yearly increases are 
significant from 1999 to 2002. Furthermore, for α  = 0.75 these increases were 
significant from 2000 onward. Thus, when comparing the endpoints of the 
period under s n t tne c  y, but 
also turned ou  o n ri n
199820.  so si r ng sta od.  
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If w s arization 
we find t n the pure 
polarization index. However, these results should be interpreted cautiously, 
bearing in mind the limitations described above.  
Table 3: Bipolarization – Argentina 
Income per Equivalent Adult 
e compare the new index with the discrete measure  of pol
hat the results for Argentina had the same upward tre d than 
EGR Wolfson
α = 0.5 α = 0.75
1998 0.279 0.239 0.154 0.441
2000 0.283 0.241 0.158 0.459
DER
2002 0.298 0.257 0.167 0.483  
Source: Gasparini, L., “Argentina’s distributional failure” (IADB, 
September 18, 2003) 
 
 
                                                 
20 Using a 95% confidence interval, the Gini coefficient increased significantly between 1998 and 2002.  
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Possible causes for po
 
To further interpret the change in polarization it is helpful to show how 
each income level adds to the total value of the index. The following figures 
display three curves: income density (de), the polarization curve (po) and the 
alienation curve (gi). The integral of the polarization curve is the value of the 
polarization index, while the integral of the alienation curve is the Gini 
coefficient. In grals is the 
entification the integral of the density function 
quals 1. 
Figure 4: Polarization, Inequality and Density – Countrywide 
larization 
 addition, the difference between these two inte
factor. By construction, id
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Figure 5: Polarization Index 1998-2002 
S   ource: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data. 
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From the previous figures we can observe that all curves become more 
leptokurtic and asym dividuals provide a 
larger share of both polarization nd lity. This increase can be seen 
clearly by superimposing the polarization curves for 1998 and 2002 (Figure 5).  
The increase in polarization at the lowest income levels was thus brought 
about by more intense alienation of the groups with highest identification. 
Ceteris paribus, there will be higher polarization the higher the correlation 
between identification and alienation.  
This change in polarization reflects an increase in potential conflict, or 
tension, especially among income groups with 0 to 0.5 of the normalized 
income per equivalent adult. These added 0.12 and 0.15 index points in 1998 
and 2002, respectively. This represents an increase in overall participation 
from
22
                                                
metric. This means that low-income in
 a  inequa
 54% to 59% 
To further inquire as to the source of these changes we performed a 
micro-decomposition of the labor income per equivalent adult. This technique 
is based upon the computation of different distributions, the actual distribution 
for year t, and that resulting from simulating the labor income of each 
of total polarization in each year21. 
individual in year t by fixing some argument of their income-determination 
function at the level of another year, t’. The arguments considered include 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the individuals, and the 
parameters that link observable characteristics with wages .  
The decomposition of the change in the DER polarization index was 
performed for the years 1998 and 2002 for values of the alpha parameter 0.5 
and 0.75, changing education levels of the population, and parametric 
estimates of returns to education, gender gap, returns to experience, region 
effects, and unobservable factors. The methodology was based on Gasparini, 
Marchionni, and Sosa Escudero (2005)23. 
Given that the micro-simulation technique is path-dependent, we 
alternatively used 1998 and 2002 as base years and computed the average 
changes. Since these are not sensitive to the choice of alpha, we will conduct 
the analysis considering alpha = 0.75.  
 
 
21 To trace the evolution throughout the period, refer to the appendix.  
g computation of micro-simulations.  
22 Gasparini, L, Marchionni, M and Sosa Escudero, W (2001) 
23 We thank Martín Cicowiez for the received wisdom regardin
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T
 
16 0.01 21.51 0.01 
Returns to Experience 26.23 0.07 21.57 0.07 
Region 26.26 0.10 21.65 0.15 
Unobservables 28.09 1.93 23.37 1.87 
Coefficients 1998 
Indicator Change Level Change
1998 Observed 26.16 2.15 21.50 2.12 
2002 Observed 28.31 23.62
Effects 
Characteristics 28.19 0.12 23.48 0.14 
Returns to Education 28.16 0.15 23.49 0.13 
Gender Gap 28.29 0.01 23.61 0.01 
Returns to Experience 28.13 0.18 23.45 0.17 
Region 28.10 0.21 23.36 0.25 
Unobservables 26.82 1.49 22.22 1.40 
able 3: Decomposition of the change in the polarization index of equivalent 
labor income 
Coefficients 2002 
Indicator Change Change
1998 Observed 26.16 21.50
α = 0.5 α = 0.75
2002 Observed 28.31 2.15 23.62 2.12 
Effects 
Characteristics 26.13 -0.03 21.46 -0.04
Returns to education 26.21 0.06 21.56 0.06 
Gender Gap 26.
α = 0.5
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
Average Change 
α=0.5 α=0.75
Indicator Change Change
1998-2002 Observed 2.15 2.12
Effects 
Characteristics 0.05 0.05
Returns to Education 0.10 0.10
Gender Gap 0.01 0.01
Returns to Experience 0.13 0.12
Region 0.15 0.20
Unobservables 1.71 1.64
α = 0.75
Level Level
Level
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Results show that on average all the effects led to an increase i
002
n 
polarization between 1998 and 2 rvable factors account for 77% 
of the dex, followed by region (9%), returns to experience 
(6%) and to education (5%). The lowest explanato er comes from 
individu teristics %) and r . 
 
II.2.2 Region n and a arison to inequality  
 
In t n we ver hat ng  
the labor t captured by regional factors wa ost rtant. This 
motivate  indicat sis in this section is 
intended  as an illustration, e an is tistic gnificance 
remains 
When analyzing polarization within regions in the period 1998 to 2002, 
we observe an upward trend, just as in the country as a whole, in all regions 
except NEA. we compare this w  regiona y index, the 
rankings ithin the ame ye p on a pha under 
consideration. For instance, in 1998 anki de from uality and 
polarization (with an alpha of 0.5) are i entical, while there are differences if 
alpha is onsidering the ges ank or bo
becomes  and pola  region of t untry enation in 
this regi t intense where i icati as est. 
Another interesting case is NOA, which witnessed an increase in 
alienation, while the identificatio ect pe this ct almost 
complete  an almost con pola ion x wh
0.75.  
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24 Only the educational characteristics effect had a versa een both years, with the average effect 
being positive. For reasons such as this, the average d be i eted cautiously.  
25 We cannot over inants of polarization in Argentina. 
In particul ues of macroeconomic instability.  
sign re l betw
 shoul nterpr
emphasize the need for deeper research on the determ
ar, for this time period we should give proper attention to iss
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Table 5: Polarization and Inequality by region 
Index Rank Index
 
Rank
 
Index Rank
NEA 0.500 1 0.287 1
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
 
Index
 
Rank
 
Index
 
Rank
 
Index
 
Rank
 GBA 0.532 1 0.299 1 0.256 1
NOA 0.497 2 0.284 3 0.245 3
NEA 0.495 3 0.286 2 0.246 2
Patagonia 0.482 4 0.276 5 0.235 5
Cuyo 0.480 5 0.279 4 0.240 4
Pampeana 0.479 6 0.276 6 0.234 6
As is evident, inequality and polarization rankings differ. Two regions 
that provide an example of this are NEA and Patagonia. A comparison of all 
three curves in both regions for the year 2002 allows us to note that the 
structure of inequality and polarization are quite different. The distribution in 
the Northeast displays greater polarization at income levels below one half of 
the mean, when we compare it with Patagonia. In NEA, this income level 
represents 0.14 index points, which amounts to roughly 58% of the total. 
Patagonia, on the other hand, has a lower polarization for this same income 
level (11% lower).  
 0.250 1
GBA 0.489 2 0.279 2 0.239 3
Patagonia 0.460 4 0.265 4 0.226 5
NOA 0.483 3 0.279 3 0.242 2
Cuyo 0.445 5 0.263 5 0.226 4
Pampeana 0.441 6 0.257 6 0.218 6
2002
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 0.75
α = 0 α = 0.5 α = 0.75
1998
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Figure 6: Polarization and Inequality in Patagonia (R5)  
and NE 6)A (R  – 2002 (α  = 0.75) 
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A final ple is by eana region, which had the 
highest increase in polarization index with an alpha o . I he 
following gr 99 2 2, n bser w  goes from a 
relatively fla c o struc a s concentrated 
in the low-in  a cl rly d  quit
for the country as a whole2  o people with 
incomes below ha
polariza
b
; de: iden  curve 
oration ased on H-INDEC data
exam provided the Pamp
f 0.75 f we look at t
aphs for 1
imodal polarization 
8 and 00 we ca  o ve ho  it
t, mult urve t  a ture th t i
come levels nd is 
6. The share in t
ea unimo
he polarization index
al, e similar to what is true 
f 
lf the mean went from 44% to 53%.  
 
Figure 5: Polarization and Inequality in Pampeana region (R2)  
1998 – 2002 (α  = 0.75) 
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26 To follow the evolution of inequality and polarization throughout the period in different regions, refer to 
the appendix. 
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Conclusions
 
The analysis of income polarization in Argentina, following the new 
methodology proposed by Duclos-Esteban-Ray for continuous variables, 
revealed a significant increase between 1998 and 2002, for various values of 
the identification parameter.  
This increase in “social tension” was fueled by two effects: the first was 
an increase in homogeneity within the group of low-income individuals; the 
second was an increase in heterogeneity between this group and the rest.  
We explored different causes by means of a micro-decomposition 
technique, finding that on average all effects we considered increased 
polari change came from 
e distrib nts were found to be of 
od
On n 
increase ith an 
associated increase of the correlation between identification and alienation. 
This change had different intensity throughout the regions, leading to distinct 
levels of “tension” within the country.  
 
zation between 1998 and 2002. Although most of the  
th
m
ution of unobservable factors, three eleme
erate importance: region, returns to education and returns to experience. 
The gender gap did not have any effects, while educational achievement 
reinforced the increase on average, but the sign of this effect was found to 
depend on the choice of the base year.  
An exploratory analysis by region showed that the rankings according to 
polarization and inequality might differ, depending on the choice of alpha. We 
also found that polarization increased across regions, with the exception of 
EA.  N
the other hand, this generalized increase went in tandem with a
in the share of in ls in the index, wlow-income dividua
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 Greater Buenos Aires (R_1)       Región Pampeana (R_2)
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Cuyo (R_3)                            NOA (R_4)
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_98 - R_3
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_98 - R_4
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_99 - R_3
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_99 - R_4
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_00 - R_3
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_00 - R_4
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_01 - R_3
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_01 - R_4
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_02 - R_3
 
0
.2
5
.5
.7
5
1
gi
/p
o/
de
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Mean Normalized Income per Equiv alent Adult
gi po
de
Polarization (alfa=0.75) and Inequality - arg_02 - R_4
 
 
 INCOME POLARIZATION IN ARGENTINA  63 
     Patagonia  (R_5)                       NEA (R_6) 
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Regional Polarization 
0.4950
1998 0.25 0.3477 0.3491 0.3204 0.3243 0.3452 0.3315 0.3549
1999 0.25 0.3450 0.3458 0.3221 0.3305 0.3360 0.3346 0.3541
2000 0.25 0.3532 0.3542 0.3296 0.3434 0.3413 0.3310 0.3559
2001 0.25 0.3650 0.3692 0.3402 0.3427 0.3500 0.3249 0.3672
2002 0.25 0.3701 0.3751 0.3449 0.3463 0.3532 0.3460 0.3547
1998 0.50 0.2792 0.2794 0.2571 0.2625 0.2791 0.2655 0.2869
1999 0.50 0.2767 0.2767 0.2577 0.2667 0.2700 0.26 0.2839
2000 0.50 0.2826 0.2829 0.2628 0.2755 0.2734 0.2641 0.2849
2001 0.50 0.2917 0.2941 0.2710 0.2723 0.2796 0.2590 0.2937
2002 0.50 0.2978 0.2990 0.2757 0.2791 0.2839 0.2764 0.2857
1998 0.75 0.2395 0.2387 0.2181 0.2259 0.2423 0.2259 0.2496
1999 0.75 0.2368 0.2365 0.2178 0.2286 0.2313 0.2259 0.2438
2000 0.75 0.2414 0.2414 0.2210 0.2357 0.2338 0.2232 0.2446
2001 0.75 0.2495 0.2512 0.2282 0.2297 0.2384 0.21 0.2516
2002 0.75 0.2572 0.2557 0.2338 0.2402 0.2449 0.234 0.2462
1998 1 0.2135 0.2117 0.1910 0.2015 0.2190 0.1992 0.2262
1999 1 0.2104 0.2099 0.1902 0.2033 0.2058 0.1981 0.2178
2000 1 0.2144 0.2141 0.1920 0.2094 0.2075 0.1951 0.2186
2001 1 0.2220 0.2233 0.1985 0.2007 0.2110 0.1894 0.2242
2002 1 0.2315 0.2274 0.2053 0.2150 0.2199 0.2062 0.2209
α Country GBA Pampeana Cuyo NOA Patagonia NEA
1998 0 0.4851 0.4887 0.4411 0.4452 0.4826 0.4599 0.5003
1999 0 0.4817 0.4842 0.4437 0.4540 0.4666 0.4626 0.4982
2000 0 0.4940 0.4961 0.4540 0.4780 0.4788 0.4573 0.5041
2001 0 0.5139 0.5222 0.4701 0.4774 0.4922 0.4495 0.5161
2002 0 0.5181 0.5318 0.4788 0.4803 0.4970 0.4818
70
80
6
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
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Polarization Index by Region 
100.0 100.0 100.0
1999 1 98.5 99.1 99.6 100.9 94.0 99.4 96.3
2000 1 100.4 101.1 100.5 103.9 94.7 97.9 96.7
2001 1 104.0 105.5 103.9 99.6 96.3 95.1 99.1
2002 1 108.4 107.4 107.4 106.7 100.4 103.5 97.6
(base 1998=100) 
α Country GBA Pampeana Cuyo NOA Patagonia NEA
1998 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1999 0 99.3 99.1 100.6 102.0 96.7 100.6 99.6
2000 0 101.8 101.5 102.9 107.4 99.2 99.4 100.7
2001 0 105.9 106.9 106.6 107.2 102.0 97.7 103.2
2002 0 106.8 108.8 108.6 107.9 103.0 104.8 98.9
1998 0.25 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1999 0.25 99.2 99.0 100.5 101.9 97.3 100.9 99.8
2000 0.25 101.6 101.5 102.9 105.9 98.9 99.8 100.3
2001 0.25 105.0 105.8 106.2 105.7 101.4 98.0 103.5
2002 0.25 106.4 107.5 107.7 106.8 102.3 104.4 99.9
1998 0.50 80.3 80.0 80.2 81.0 80.9 80.1 80.8
1999 0.50 79.6 79.3 80.4 82.2 78.2 80.5 80.0
2000 0.50 81.3 81.0 82.0 85.0 79.2 79.7 80.3
2001 0.50 83.9 84.2 84.6 84.0 81.0 78.1 82.8
2002 0.50 85.6 85.6 86.0 86.1 82.3 83.4 80.5
1998 0.75 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1999 0.75 98.9 99.1 99.9 101.2 95.5 100.0 97.7
2000 0.75 100.8 101.1 101.4 104.3 96.5 98.8 98.0
2001 0.75 104.2 105.2 104.6 101.7 98.4 96.5 100.8
2002 0.75 107.4 107.1 107.2 106.3 101.1 103.8 98.7
1998 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EPH-INDEC data.  
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E POLARIZATION, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 
 
 
MATÍAS HORENSTEIN AND SERGIO OLIVIERI 
 
SUMMARY 
 
JEL Classification: D31, D63,  I32. 
This paper applies newly developed methods for the computation of income 
polarization by Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) to the Argentine case between 1998 and 
2002. We find that despite the slowdown in the growth of the inequality, the rate of 
growth of polarization increased every year. Low-income groups in the population 
were those who contributed the most to polarization. The results of a micro-
decomposition show that on average all the effects led to an increase in polarization 
between 1998 and 2002. Although most of the change came from unobservable 
factors, region, returns to education and return to experience had a moderate impact. 
Furthermore, polarization increased within every geographic region. This change had 
different intensity throughout them leading to distinct levels of “tension” within the 
country.   
IN
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